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Abstract
In this conceptual paper we propose to explore the analogy between
ontic/epistemic description of quantum phenomena and interrelation
between dynamics of conformational and functional states of proteins.
Another new idea is to apply theory of automata to model the latter
dynamics. In our model protein’s behavior is modeled with the aid of
two dynamical systems, ontic and epistemic, which describe evolution
of conformational and functional states of proteins, respectively. The
epistemic automaton is constructed from the ontic automaton on the
basis of functional (observational) equivalence relation on the space
of ontic states. This reminds a few approaches to emergent quantum
mechanics in which a quantum (epistemic) state is treated as repre-
senting a class of prequantum (ontic) states. This approach does not
match to the standard protein structure-function paradigm. However,
it is perfect for modeling of behavior of intrinsically disordered pro-
teins. Mathematically space of protein’s ontic states (conformational
states) is modeled with the aid of p-adic numbers or more general
ultrametric spaces encoding the internal hierarchical structure of pro-
teins. Connection with theory of p-adic dynamical systems is briefly
discussed.
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1 Introduction
In this note we apply automata theory [1], [2], [3] to modeling dynamics of
proteins’ states. The protein automaton model is presented by exploring the
scientific methodology which plays the important role in foundations of quan-
tum physics. This methodology is based on joint exploring of the two descrip-
tive levels: ontic and epistemic. The ontic description is about reality “as it
is” and the epistemic description is about observations, see Atmanspacher et
al. [4]-[6], see also [7]-[9]. Now we want to apply this methodology to molec-
ular biology. Conformation states of proteins are treated as ontic states and
functional states or states approachable for observations as epistemic states.
Such a separation of two descriptive levels is very fruitful in creation of an
adequate model of dynamics of proteins’ states. Moreover, it matches well
with automata theory [1]: automata without output represent dynamics of
ontic states, in our case conformational states, and automata with outputs
represent dynamics of epistemic states, in our case functional/observational
states.
We do not pretend that proteins are genuine quantum systems; we just
want to use the methodology of ontic-epistemic states designed for quan-
tum mechanics, see appendix 1 for discussion. The starting point linking
dynamics of proteins with factorization models of quantum phenomena is
the observation that the space of conformational states of a protein is huge
and the concrete conformational states can be unobservables. Thus, as in
quantum physics, one has to proceed with two types of states: ontic states
(conformational states of a protein) and epistemic states (observable states
representing various functions of a protein). We remark that, for a protein,
the number of epistemic states is small, since each protein is a highly special-
ized biological machine with a few functions. At the same time the number
of conformational states is huge.
In short we plan to model protein’s state dynamics as functioning of an
automaton without output having a huge configuration space (of conforma-
tional states); by adding output to this automaton we construct the model of
observations of protein’s functional states (epistemic states). Such an obser-
vational output produces factorization of the space of conformational states
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and can be mathematically represented as new “factorized automaton”. In
the framework of this automaton-model we discuss a number of conceptual
problems related to production of functional states of proteins from confor-
mational states. We emphasize that this is a concept-type paper. Our main
aim is to present the concept of the automaton-protein. We also rise a series
of questions which have to be clarified to make this model closer to the real
biological situation, section 7. We plan to work on these questions in coming
publications.
This model of protein’s behavior does not match the standard protein
structure-function paradigm formulated more than one hundred years ago
[10], [11]. (In the operational terms by this paradigm the ontic and epistemic
descriptions can be unified in the straightforward manner.) At the same time
the ontic/epistemic operational approach is perfect for modeling of behavior
of intrinsically disordered proteins [12], see section 2 for the discussion on
recent studies of the molecular biological features of proteins’ functioning.
We want that the paper will be readable for biologists. Therefore we try
to minimize the mathematical apparatus in the use. The basic mathematical
formalism under consideration is theory of automata, see [1] and section 3
for definition. We illustrate our model by a few illustrative examples, see
Figures 1-3.
The presented model can be formulated in more advanced mathemati-
cal terms; in particular, by formalizing the mathematical structure of the
ontic state space. We discuss shortly this problem appendix 2. The most
natural model of proteins’ state space is based on so called p-adic numbers,
where p > 1 is a natural number. For p prime, these numbers are widely
used in theory of dynamical systems, physics, biology and psychology [13]-
[36]. We remark a kind of similarity between the p-adic state representation
of protein’s state dynamics and application of p-adic dynamical systems to
encryption of data, see Anashin [13, 16, 18]. Thus one may speculate that
nature encrypted functioning of proteins by using methods of p-adic cryp-
tography. This is an interesting idea, but in this paper we cannot elaborate
it in more detail (in particular, such elaboration would lead to exploration
of advanced mathematics of theory of p-adic dynamical systems).
Finally, we remark that statistics of quantum observations has some pe-
culiarities [37], see also appendix 1 with discussion on the Bell inequality. In
physics it is known that automata-dynamics can generate some features of
quantum statistics [4]. In this note we show that biological systems such as
proteins (and others having huge configuration space of internal states and
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just a few functional/observational states) can demonstrate special statis-
tical features (even generation of p-adic probabilities corresponding to the
absence of statistical stabilization of frequencies of outputs, see [38], [15] for
such probabilities and their role in non-Archimedean physics and biology).
2 Dynamics of proteins conformational and
functional states from the perspective of
molecular biology
In this section we apply the ontic-epistemic approach to state dynamics
(which we borrow from quantum foundations) to the protein dynamics.
By the the protein structure-function paradigm, any protein function is
determined by a fixed three-dimensional structure [11]. This paradigm has
been dominating in molecular biology during more than one hundred years,
see Fischer [10] for one of the pioneer studies. At the same time it was chal-
lenged during many years including experimental evidences of its violation.
Nevertheless, it stayed firmly as the cornerstone of molecular biology; only
the discovery of intrinsically disordered proteins (IDPs), Dunker et al. [12],
Dyson and Wright [39], Dunker et al. [40] changed (at least partially) the
common viewpoint on the structure-function isomorphism. Nowadays it is
widely understood that “functioning proteins do not remain fixed in a unique
structure, but instead they sample a range of conformations facilitated by motions
within the protein”, Ramanathan et al. [41], see also Henzler-Wildman et al.
[42].
We recall that the native state of a protein is its completely folded func-
tional state. However, opposite to the protein structure-function paradigm,
the native state is no uniquely determined by protein’s geometry. We again
cite Ramanathan et al. [41]:
“Even in the native state, a protein exists as a collection of interconverting con-
formations driven by thermodynamic fluctuations. Motions on the fast time scale
allow a protein to sample conformations in the nearby area of its conformational
landscape, while motions on slower time scales give it access to conformations in
distal areas of the landscape.”
It is important to point out that this is the general picture of protein’s
functioning and not only IDP’s functioning.
This picture matches perfectly with the ontic-epistemic approach to the
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description of dynamics of physical and biological systems. The concrete
conformational states of a protein are typically unapproachable by experi-
menters. From the modern viewpoint, the native state, the functional state,
cannot be identified with the concrete conformational state. It represents
an ensemble of conformational states. Moreover, the native state is a fuzzy
notation for a family of functional substates and protein’s functioning can be
represented as the dynamics in the space of these substates. Each of them
corresponds to a special subensemble of conformational states. “Emerging
evidence indicates that protein landscapes contain conformational substates with
dynamic and structural features that support the designated function of the pro-
tein”, [41]. In this paper we shall identify such “substates” with the functional
states of a protein.
Thus we have the two levels description of protein’s dynamics:
• conformational states dynamics: fast and stochastic;
• functional states dynamics: slower and deterministic
(see, e.g., Henzler-Wildman et al. [42] on time scales in protein dynamics).
One of the main consequences of the experimental and theoretical stud-
ies is that the dynamics of conformational states, in spite of its stochastic
nature, has the functional meta-meaning, i.e., it is not reduced to thermo-
dynamical fluctuations. This is a delicate point and we shall try to explain
it in more detail. Physically there are, of course, thermodynamical fluctua-
tions. But proteins were able to shape these fluctuations in the functional
way - to perform transitions (through long chains of rapid conformations)
from one functional state to another, see Hammes et al. [43], Ramanathan
and Agarwal [44], Ramanathan et al. [45].
Nuclear magnetic resonance devices can be used to determine ensembles
of conformational states of proteins. This is not the end of the experimen-
tal studies: X-ray crystallography allows researchers to identify the most
populated states along the landscape. In the functional cycles of proteins,
ensembles of conformational states (determining functional sates) are trans-
ferred from one to another. Such ensemble transformations are approachable
for the experimental inspection. However, the dynamics of conformational
states in subensembles determining functional states and their jumps from
one ensemble to another cannot be detected, at least by existing measurement
devices, cf. again with the situation in quantum physics.
5
We emphasize that in contrast to quantum physics, in molecular biology
there are no doubts in the existence of conformational states in a protein
“as it is” (although in general they are not accessible experimentally). Of
course, there is the crucial difference between molecular biology and quantum
physics. In biology it is possible “to see” the spatial structure of a protein and
concrete geometric figures can be used for labeling of conformational states.
In quantum physics, the existing measurement devices do not provide the
possibility of determination of a similar fine structure.
3 Automaton model of protein
As a model of the protein dynamics, we consider an automaton [1] A =
〈I, S, V, f, g〉, where I (V ) is input (output) alphabet, S is the set of states,
f : I × S → S and g : I × S → V are function of transition and output,
respectively, i.e., depending on the iteration of functioning of the automaton:
sk+1 = f(ik, sk), k ≥ 0. (1)
vk = g(ik, sk), k ≥ 0. (2)
At the moment n = 0 the automaton A is at the state s0; once fed by the
input symbol i0 ∈ I, A outputs the symbol v0 = g(i0, s0) ∈ O and reaches
the state s1 = f(i0, s0) ∈ S; then A is fed by the next input symbol i1 ∈ I
and repeats the routine.
The automaton A transfer words with respect to the alphabet I to words
with respect to the alphabet V . This map, defined on the set of I-words
and taking values in the set of V -words and determined with the aid of two
functions, f and g, i.e., associated with the automaton A, is denoted as FA.
To construct the automaton model of the protein dynamics, we have to
describe its basic parameters:
• States. We assume that a protein consists of N connected elementary
units, e.g., molecules, and that each of them has p degrees of freedom.
Here p > 1 is a natural number. Each conformational state of a protein
is represented as the vector
~s = (x0, . . . , xN−1), xi ∈ Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}. (3)
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• Input and output alphabets. The input alphabet represents the impact of
protein’s environment, e.g., temperature, ferments, chemical molecules
around it. In our mathematical model it is assumed that influences of
the environment can be represented numerically, as the elements of the
set I. The output alphabet represents the results of observations on a
protein; these results are represented as elements of the set V.
• Functions. The function f is determined by the structure of a concrete
protein. The function g is selected depending on the way of observation
on a protein: the input alphabet (impact of the environment), the space
of states S, and the transition function f.
Thus in our model protein by itself is represented as an automaton without
output. The output represents observations. Their aim is to reconstruct
protein’s parameters.
We remark that automata with finite state space S = {s1, ..., sm} (and the
fixed initial state s0 ∈ S) are known as theMealy machines [46]. It is not clear
whether a protein has to be modeled as a Mealy machine. Conformational
states of protein are determined by a variety of physical parameters, including
the geometric configurations. The space of such parameters can be infinite
and even continuous. Of course, mathematically it is easier to proceed with
Mealy machines.
4 Factor-automaton from observed output se-
quence
We remark that the space S of possible conformational states of a protein is
huge, it contains Nconf = p
N (N ∼ 300) elements. Therefore to construct an
automaton working on such a space and completely describing functioning
of the concrete protein is practically impossible. Thus the existence of such
a complete automaton has basically only a theoretical value. Possible ob-
servations cannot determine uniquely protein’s state, one fixed among Nconf
states of S, at the instant of measurement, i.e., observations are not able to
distinguish states from S.
In reality from observable data we can construct only some factor-automaton
for the “complete automaton” A (ontic automaton).1 To construct the factor-
1This situation reminds emergence of the quantum model, treated as an operational
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automaton representing observations, we consider the following equivalence
relation ρ on the set S. The states s1, s2 are ρ-equivalent, non-distinguishable
with respect to observations, if
g(i, s1) = g(i, s2) ∀i ∈ I.
The factor-set Sρ of S with respect to ρ is considered as the space of
states of the new automaton Aρ. The functions f and g have to “respect”
the equivalence relation ρ, i.e., if
s1ρs2,
then
fρ(i, s1) = fρ(i, s2), gρ(i, s1) = gρ(i, s2), i ∈ I.
The Aρ = 〈I, Sρ, V, fρ, gρ〉 is called the factor-automaton of the original au-
tomaton A.
Thus at the level of observation conformational states of a protein have
to be unified in some classes, cf. again with ontic-epistemic approach to
quantum theory.
The same model can be used in more concrete biological framework (con-
certizing the above general observational model). We can consider a protein
as well specialized biological machine which performs a few concrete func-
tions. In terms of automaton’s states this viewpoint means that on the space
of conformational states S it is possible to define some equivalence relation
which is determined by protein functions. Such a functionality-factorization
also leads to the factor-automaton of the original protein-automaton. Thus
the states of the factor-automaton can be treated as functional states of a
protein.
Fig. 1 illustrates construction of factor-automata. At this figure the
ovals C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 represent classes of equivalence with respect to an
equivalence relation defined on the space of all possible states S; in section
5 we shall present detailed construction of the concrete factor-automaton.
observation model, from prequantum models; generation of epistemic state description
from the ontic state description, see the introduction.
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Figure 1. Functional states of a protein
In future the set of states of the automaton A belonging to some equiva-
lence class with respect to aforementioned equivalence relation we shall call
a generalized state of the automaton. This terminology is useful to have the
possibility to consider states of the factor-atomaton Aρ as sets. In another
terminology generalized states are basins, i.e., a basin can be considered as
a class of equivalence with respect to some equivalence relation ρ.
5 Example of construction of factor automa-
ton
Let us consider automaton A = 〈I, S, Y, f, F 〉, where I = {0, 1, 2} denotes
the input alphabet, Y = {a, b, c, d} denotes the output alphabet, and S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8} is the state space. The transition function f and
the output function g are given by Table 1.
Table 1. Transition and output functions for the original automaton.
Table 1 shows that, for this automaton, output depends only on the state.
Such automata are known as the Moore machines, see section 9.1. The diagram
of transitions of the (Moore) automaton determined by Table 1 is represented on
the graph of Fig. 2. We repeat that here g : S → V, i.e., it is independent of the
input symbol i.
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f(i, s) (s)
(i) s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
0 s1 s3 s1 s4 s4 s7 s8 s6
1 s3 s1 s2 s4 s2 s5 s5 s5
2 s4 s4 s4 s4 s7 s8 s6 s8
g(i, s) (s)
(i) s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
0 a a a b c d d d
1 a a a b c d d d
2 a a a b c d d d
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Figure 2. Transition diagram of the original automaton.
We consider the following equivalence relation ρ on the set of states. It
is determined with the aid of the disjoint partition of the set of states: S =
{s1, s2, s3} ∪ {s4} ∪ {s5} ∪ {s6, s7, s8}.
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The equivalence relation ρ is consistent with the transition function f, see
Table 1, i.e. if sαρsβ, then f(i, sα)ρf(i, sβ), i ∈ I; ρ is also consistent with the
output function g.
Now consider the new automaton A/ρ = 〈I, S/ρ, Y, fρ, gρ〉, factor-automaton
with respect to ρ, which is consistent with the transition and output ’ functions
(congruence of the original automaton), where
S/ρ = {S1 = {s1, s2, s3}, S2 = {s4}, S3 = {s5}, S4 = {s6, s7, s8}},
and the transition function fρ and the output function gρ are given by Table 2.
fρ (S)
(i) S1 S2 S3 S4
0 S1 S2 S2 S4
1 S1 S2 S1 S3
2 S4 S2 S4 S4
gρ (S)
(i) S1 S2 S3 S4
0 a b c d
1 a b c d
2 a b c d
Table 2. Transition and output functions for the
factor automaton.
The diagram of transitions of the automaton A/ρ determined by Table 2 is
presented at Fig. 3.
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Figure 3. Transition diagram of the factor automaton.
6 Protein as a Moore machine?
As was remarked in the previous section, the automaton determined by Table
1 and Fig. 2 belongs to the class of automata known as the Moore machines
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[47]: a finite-state machine (which initial state is fixed) whose output values are
determined solely by its current state. Such automata are widely used in computer
science and digital electronics.
A bio-system modeled by a Moore machine used environmental inputs only
to modify its internal states. Functional outputs are determined solely by the
latter. Such machines, although perfectly adaptive to signals from the surrounding
environment, have some degree of independence. First they handle environment’s
signal to modify the state and only later use this state to produce a functional
output. Thus the information from outside is used not straightforwardly. We
can say that it is “analyzed” inside the bio-system and only then used for the
corresponding functional response. This is the reason to use the Moore machines
to model protein’s behavior.
We remark that many digital electronic systems work as Moore machines of
the special type, so called clocked sequential systems. In such a system the state
changes only when the global clock signal changes. This change of the state in-
duces change of the output. Clocked sequential systems are one way to solve
metastability problems.
We stress that a Moore machine is the finite state machine. However, as was
already pointed out in section 3, we have reasons both in favor and against using
the finite state automata for modeling protein’s behavior. Therefore it is useful to
consider so to say infinite state Moore machines. For such an automaton, its state
space S can be infinite and even continuous and the output function depend only
on the state
The coupling of our protein model with computer science and digital electronics
is the interesting topic for further speculations on the computational structure of
functioning of cell’s components and cells in general. Another important topic is
comparison of our modeling of protein’s functioning with mathematical modeling of
intelligence, both biological and artificial. The basic model of artificial intelligence
(or to be more rigorous computing) is given by the Turing machine. The latter
is definitely more powerful than finite state automata, the Mealy machines and,
in particular, the Moore machines. However, in our modeling of activity of a
protein molecular we do not restrict consideration to the finite state automata.
Comparison of behavioral features of bio-systems modeled with the aid of Turing
machines and infinite automata is the interesting problem related to intelligence
of bio-systems. In particular, it can be the starting point in development of theory
of intelligence of proteins.
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7 Problems related to analysis of observational
data
As was pointed out, the automaton model of a protein is an automaton without
output. However, initially we do not know the structure of this automaton, i.e.,
the space of states, transition functions, and very often neither the input alphabet
which encodes influence of environment on behavior of a protein. To reconstruct
the parameters of the automaton model of a protein, we have to use the results
of observations on protein’s behaviour. For this aim, the automaton model of a
protein is completed by the output alphabet V and the output function g which
are determined by possibilities of observations.
Thus we consider an automaton with output A = 〈I, S, V, f, g〉, where V is
the output alphabet and g I × S → V is the output function. As the result of
functioning of this automaton with output we observe a sequence of the form:
vk = g(ik, sk), k ≥ 0. (4)
We remark that by itself the automaton model of a protein is considered as the
automaton 〈I, S, f〉, where, as we shall consider in future, the set of states S
consists of generalized states.
From observation on the output sequence vk, k ≥ 0 of the automaton A we
can make conclusions about behavior of the protein-automaton as well as about its
structure (states, transition functions, input sequences ans so on). In particular,
we can consider the following problems:
• if the transition function fρ is only partially defined, then from observations
vk, k ≥ 0, it can be reconstructed;
• it is possible to reconstruct (determine) the input alphabet of an automaton,
i.e., to check the influence of an input symbol on automaton’s behavior;
• to check the presence of equivalent states by using the output sequence; in
other words, to clarify the structure of the equivalence relation on the set of
states, i.e., states of the form ~s = (s0, . . . , sN−1);
• to check matching of an automaton with the output data (observed in ex-
periments);
• to determine the initial state of the automaton A.
Since the automaton A can have generalized states, its output sequences vk, k ≥
0 can have the following specific feature. An output sequence of the automaton
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A can contain a long sequence of equal elements. Such sequences appear if the
automaton is being in some fixed generalized state. If the output sequence is con-
sidered as realizations of some random variable γ, then the presence of long series
can imply some “pathological features” of γ, e.g., γ does not have the mathemat-
ical expectation. Such features make difficult construction of a proper statistical
criteria for solution of aforementioned problems.
To illustrate this situation, we consider behavior of the automaton A in a
neighborhood of a generalized state C as it is shown at Fig. 4.
✘
✙
✛
✚ q q q
q q q
s❝
❝
❝❝
❝
sss s
i1
s1 s2
i2
C
C−1 C1✙s ✯ ✙ s✯
Figure 4. Unconventional probabilistic behavior.
There are three generalized states C−1, C, C1. Each of generalized states
C−1, C1 contains just one conformational state. The generalized state C consists
of 2pr, where p > 1 is a natural number, conformational states (the states s1, ..., s2
belong to C). Conformation states composing C form two special classes, at
Fig. 4 they are represented by white and black spots. Each class contains pr
conformational states.
The automaton is functioning in the following way. If it is in state C−1 (C1),
then, for each input, the automaton is transferred into the conformational state s1
(s2) belonging to the generalized state C. If the automaton is in one of conforma-
tional states composing C, excluding the states s1 and s2, and marked by white
(black) points, then for each input the automaton is transferred into the closest
from the left-hand (right-hand) side state. Thus in the generalized state C the
automaton goes through conformational states composing C cyclically. For the
states s1 and s2, its behavior is more complex. There are two possible transitions
scenarios. If input symbol is i1 (i2), then the automaton jumps into the generalized
state C−1 (C1). If the input symbol is different from i1 (i2), then the automaton
stays in the generalized state C and its state is changed in accordance with the
general law of cyclic dynamics insied C.
Suppose now that the output function of the automaton g depends only on the
generalized state, i.e., it does not depend on input and automaton’s output v−1 is
observed if the automaton is in the state C−1 (respectively, v and v1 for C, C1 ).
Since in the state C the automaton can stay ξpr steps of dynamics, where ξ is
some integer valued random variable, in general the relative frequency of appear-
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ance of the symbol v in the output sequence can fluctuate, without stabilization
to any constant - probability. Thus the probability P (C) of the state C is not well
defined. Besides of this “probabilistic pathology” (violation of von Mises principle
of stabilization of relative frequences), we point to another feature of behavior of
relative frequencies: for the states v−1 and v1, they approach zero (when the length
of the output sequence approaches infinity). Thus the probabilities of appearance
of this automaton in the states C−1, C1 equal to zero. Therefore from the proba-
bilistic viewpoint these states can be simply eliminated from the model. However,
this will lead to a biologically inadequate model.
For such sequences of observations, we can use the apparatus of generalized
probability theory based on representation of probabilities not by real numbers
from the segment [0, 1], but by so called p-adic numbers, where p > 1 is a prime
number. In this framework the relative frequencies (which are always rational
numbers) are embedded into the fields of p-adic numbers Qp and their limits are
considered in these fields. In this way the probabilities P (C) and P (C−1), P (C1)
are well defined and the last two of them are nonzero. In this paper we cannot go
in more details, see [38], [15].
8 Automaton model: some features of pro-
tein’s behavior and interpretations
In this section we shall consider some special features of protein’s behavior implied
by our automaton-model and possible interpretations of these features.
1. Testing the presence of generalized states. Consider the following situation
represented at Fig. 5.1 and 5.2. In the first case the automanton has only
two generalized states for which we observe outputs v−1 and v1, respectively.
In the second case (Fig. 5.2) there is the generalized state C between the
states C−1 and C1. However, when this automaton is in the state C no
outputs are observed. If the automaton is in the state C1 (C−1), but has
not yet moved to the state C−1 (C1), then the symbol v1 (v−1) is observed
at the output sequence .
sC−1 C1✙s ✯
❄ ❄v−1 v1
Figure 5.1. No intermediate state
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Figure 5.2. Intermediate state
The output sequence can be used to determine the presence of an intermedi-
ate state C which can be present in a protein. The presence of such a state
C implies that the output sequence of the automaton presented at Fig. 5.2
contains series of elements v−1 and v1. The lengths of series can be considered
as values of some random variable. In the case of the automaton presented
at Fig. 5.1 the output sequence also consists of the elements v−1 and v1.
In principle this sequence also can contain long series of these elements, but
their probabilistic structure differs from the probabilistic structure of the
series in the output sequence generated by the automaton of Fig. 5.2. We
now point to one of the important marks of the presence of an intermedi-
ate state C : in the sequence produced by the automaton of Fig. 5.2, the
law of stabilization of relative frequencies of appearance of v−1 and v1 can
be violated. As was remarked, for analysis of such statistical data, p-adic
probability methods can be applied.
2. The presence of generalized states and protein’s transition time. Our model
with generalized states as composed of internal (conformational) states of
proteins can explain the well known experimental fact that transition of a
protein from one functional state to another can take long time and, more-
over, that the interval of transition time can vary essentially from transition
to transition, Henzler-Wildman et al. [42]. Thus the descriptive level based
on ontic states of proteins has some explanatory power for observable (epis-
temic) features of proteins.
3. Hierarchy. By using the automaton model of a protein the set of generalized
states, functional states of proteins, can be endowed with hierarchic struc-
tures, in particular, tree-like. We remark that the feature of the model that
transition from one functional state to another is performed through other
generalized states (Ramanathan et al. [41]) can be explained even without
appealing to a hierarchic structure in proteins. (For example, the graph rep-
resented at Fig. 6 is, in fact, the binary tree. However, the presence of the
tree-like structure is not straightforwardly visible at Fig. 6.) To fill hierarchy
with nontrivial content (i.e., not just the graphic scheme), perhaps we have
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to use some additional criteria. For example, a hierarchy determining rule
can be based on the magnitude of the total energy of transition from one
functional state to another or the magnitude of the potential energy barrier
separating these states, cf. with works [].s
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Figure 6. Tree-like structure of protein-automaton.
4. Functional inseparability. In the framework of the protein-automaton we
can consider the following extremal case. For example, the factor-automaton
consists of a single generalized state C - the native state of a protein. In such
a situation we are not able to separate functional abilities of conformational
states. Even by knowing that the number of conformational states is huge we
have the trivial factor-automaton. Moreover, the impossibility of epistemic
splitting of C strongly supports the protein structure-function paradigm. It
is very attractive to extend this uniqueness from the epistemic level to the
ontic level. And this happened at the first stage of development of molecular
biology (in fact, the very long stage), see section 2.
However, from the modern viewpoint [41], the space of conformational (on-
tic) states has to be divided into classes - generalized (epistemic) states. The
latter states have to be distinguishable from the functional viewpoint (as rep-
resenting observable behavior of a protein). The behavior of a protein inside
a generalized state can be considered as “random and equiprobabilistic” and
having no influence on functioning of a protein.
We remark that from the protein-automaton viewpoint the rather common
thesis that proteins are biological machines posses the following constraint
on the relative number of generalized states Ngen. It has to be small, but
at the same time not too small. On one hand, if Ngen is large, then such a
biological machine has to perform a large number of various functions or if
all these generalized states (“substates of the native state” in terminology
of Ramanathan et al. [41]) are involved in a single functional cycle, then
its performance will take too much time. This contradict to the experiment
and the thesis that a protein is similar to a machine. On the other hand, if
Ngen is very small (e.g., just one as in the above example), then behavior of
such a biological system is trivial (from the epistemological viewpoint).
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9 Mathematical formalism
In the previous sections we tried to minimize the use of the mathematical ap-
paratus; in fact, we proceed with only one mathematical structure, automaton,
representing states’ dynamics. Now we want to be more precise in mathematical
terms.
9.1 P -adic model of the space of conformational states
For a mathematical model of the state space of the protein-automaton, we can
consider infinite sequences (cf. with (3)):
~s = (x0, . . . , xN−1, ...), xi ∈ Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}. (5)
Here p > 1 is a natural number. Denote the space of such sequences by the
symbol Zp. For mathematical modeling, it is useful to endow Zp. with an algebraic
structure similar to the algebraic structure on real numbers. Each sequence is
represented as the series of the form:
~s =
∞∑
i=0
xip
i, xi ∈ Fp. (6)
We remark that the set of natural numbers N is the subset of Zp consisting of
finite sums (expansions of natural numbers with respect to the base p). Moreover,
negative integers can be also represented in the form of such power series, by using
so called complement code representation which is standard for computer science.
For example, if p = 2, then −1 = 11111....1..... =
∑∞
i=0 2
i. Thus even the set of
integers Z can be embedded in Zp. The operations of addition, subtraction and
multiplication can be extended from Z onto Zp. We obtain the algebraic structure
called a ring. Division is in general not well defined, see, e.g., [15] for details.
The space S = Zp can serve as the mathematical model of the (ontic) state
space of the protein-automaton. It can be endowed with a metric which is so called
ultrametric, see section 9.2. Thus the (ontic) state space of the protein-automaton
is the ultrametric space. Ultrametricity expresses mathematically the hierarchic
structure of the state space, see section 9.2. This is the simplest ultrametric
mathematical model.
In a more general model the ranges of digits xi need not coincide, i.e., xi ∈
Fpi = {0, 1, ..., pi−1}, where pi > 1 is a natural number. The latter model is more
natural, since encoding unit i in the digital representation of protein’s state, see (3)
and (5), can have its own degree of complexity reflected in the number pi. We set
p = (p0, ..., pk, ...). Denote the space of sequences with xi ∈ Fpi by the symbol Zp.
This space can also be endowed with the algebraic structure and the ultrametric.
Unfortunately, analysis on Zp is very complicated. In particular, nothing was done
to develop theory of dynamical systems for such spaces. And the latter can serve
as a tool to construct concrete examples of protein’s state dynamics, see section
9.2.
9.2 Ultrametricity
Typically a hierarchic structure in a physical or biological system can be mathe-
matically presented as ultrametricity, i.e., the ultrametric space structure on the
state space. The ultrametric model is widely used in theory of complex disordered
systems (e.g., spin glasses) [22]-[24], in genetics [25]- [27], cognition and psychol-
ogy [28]-[36]. We recall briefly the definition of an ultrametric space and the main
features of its system of neighborhoods given by ultrametric balls. We start with
the terminological remark: ultrametric spaces are also known as non-Archimedean
spaces [15].
Let S be a set (in our case the state space of a protein, the space of its
conformational states). Let d : S × S → R+ be a metric (distance). It is called
an ultrametric if, besides the standard triangle inequality, it satisfies the strong
triangle inequality:
d(x, y) ≤ max[d(x, z), d(z, y)], x, y, z ∈ S. (7)
This inequality for a metric implies many unusual features of the system of neigh-
borhoods in S given by the balls
Ur(a) = {x ∈ S : d(x, y) ≤ r}, U
−
r (a) = {x ∈ S : d(x, y) < r},
where r > 0 and a ∈ S.
1. All balls are topologically open and closed at the same time - “clopen”.
2. They are either disjoint or one is subset of another.
3. Any point b belonging to the ball can be chosen as its center. Thus if
b ∈ Ur(a), then Ur(a) = Ur(b). The same holds for balls U
−
r (a). We can say
that “all points of a ball-neighborhood have equal rights.”
We now turn to our factor-automaton model of protein functioning. If we take
any conformational state s belonging to a functional state C, then s completely
determines the latter - as a representative of the factor class C. Consider the func-
tional state C as a neighborhood of the conformational state s. Then any s ∈ C
can be treated as the center of this neighborhood. Thus all conformational states
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belonging to a functional state “have equal rights” (from the observational view-
point they produce the same output). This is an exhibition of ultrametricity of
the state space of the automaton-protein. This is so to say epistemic ultrametric-
ity, it is generated by functional factorization of conformational states. By using
ultrametric spaces we can represent functional states by balls C = Ur(s).
Consider the mathematical model in which the space of conformational states
S = Zp (the ring of p-adic integers) and all functional states are given by balls of
the same radius r = 1/pk. The set of all conformational states S can be represented
as the disjoint union of the balls of the radius r : S = ∪p
k−1
j=0 Ur(j). This state space
of balls can be obtained as the output of the factorization procedure on S based
on the mod pn equivalence relation: for x, y ∈ Zp, x ∼ y if and only if x − y is
divisible by pn (see (6) for number-theoretic presentation of elements of Zp).
Functioning of the protein-automaton can be described as a p-adic dynamical
system [13]-[18], see appendix 2.
10 Conclusion
We proposed to model protein behavior by using theory of automata.
We pointed out to similarity between modeling of behavior of proteins and
quantum systems. In analysis of quantum foundations some authors explore the
ontic-epistemic methodology, see Appendix 1. Quantum mechanics is treated as
the epistemic (observational) model which can be emergent from a causal ontic
(subquantum) model, see, e.g., Atmanspacher et al. [4]-[6], Khrennikov [7, 8],
’t Hooft [49] and Anashin [50], [51].2 The states of the latter are not directly
approachable for external inspection. In some models [4], [7, 8], [49] transition from
the subquantum (ontic) level to the quantum (observational) level is performed
through factorization of the space of subquantum states. Thus the states described
by the quantum formalism are treated as the symbolic images of factor classes of
ontic states. Moreover, in quantum mechanics there are widely used dynamical
systems to model ontic7→epistemic transition, see [4], [52].
This is the good place to remark that recent development of physics is char-
acterized by creation of a number of novel automaton models describing state
dynamics. This activity was culminated in ‘t Hooft’s model of totally determinis-
tic dynamical universe [49] functioning as a cellular automaton.3 We also mention
2At the same time other experts follow the tradition of the Copenhagen school and
reject the possibility of emergent treatment of quantum mechanics, see the work of Plot-
nitsky and Khrennikov for detailed analysis [48].
3We emphasize that one has to distinguish sharply theory of cellular automata from
general theory of automata used in our paper. The common use of the word “automaton”
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the recent work of Anashin [50], [51], an attempt to derive the wave structure of
quantum theory from theory of p-adic dynamics systems.
Now we tern to molecular biology. The dimension of the space of possible
conformation states of proteins is huge and these states are not approachable for
direct external inspection. Therefore it is natural to proceed similarly to the ontic-
epistemic approach to quantum mechanics and to work jointly with two coupled
models of protein’s behavior:
• the ontic model describing dynamics of conformational states;
• the epistemic model describing functional states of a protein.
The dynamics of conformational states is described by an automaton, discrete
time and state dynamical machine. Input symbols encode the influences of the
environment (the state of the surrounding cell and signaling from other cells).
The transition function f = f(i, s) describes transitions between internal states
of protein (conformational states) generated by interaction of a protein molecular
with the cell-environment; the output function g = g(i, s) describes functional
outputs of the protein molecular. The dynamics of functional states is described
by the factor-automaton generated through functional equivalence relation on the
space of conformational states and the corresponding factorization of the state
space and the transition and output functions. Here it is the good place to cite
once again Ramanathan et al. [41]: “Motions on the fast time scale allow a protein
to sample conformations in the nearby area of its conformational landscape, while
motions on slower time scales give it access to conformations in distal areas of
the landscape.” The mentioned fast scale dynamics is the automaton dynamics
of ontic states, slow scale dynamics describes transitions of epistemic states. The
later can be slow enough comparing with the fact scale transitions, because any
epistemic (functional) state is composed of a large number of ontic states. The
protein molecular can spend a lot of time inside such a cluster of conformational
states before to jump to the next cluster representing another epistemic state.
This factor-space structure of the space of functional states can lead to non-
classical probabilistic behavior. We remark that in the complete accordance with
the ontic-epistemic approach nonclassicality of probability is a purely epistemic
feature. At the ontic level, classical probability works well. Such a model can
generate very exotic probability distributions, not only quantum-like, cf. [4]-[6],
[7, 7], [49], but even so called p-adic probability distributions [15]. The latter were
invented in p-adic (non-Archimedean) physics to provide the probabilistic inter-
pretation of wave functions valued in the fields of p-adic numbers or more general
can be misleading. Here we have no possibility to go into details. We just point to the
reader that this paper is not about cellular automata!
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non-Archimedean (ultrametric) number fields. Then a few theoretical biological
models generating p-adic probabilities were invented and theory was completed
with numerical simulation. Now we hope that p-adic probability theory can find
real applications in molecular biology. Of course, these are just preliminary con-
ceptual considerations.
In appendix 2 we presented coupling (due to Anashin) of theory of automata
with mappings in the fields of p-adic numbers. We tried to make the first steps to
describe the class of automata and corresponding p-adic maps matching function-
ing of proteins. This will be the main direction of our further studies. To proceed
in this direction, we have to analyze functioning of proteins in more detail, espe-
cially from the biological side (and not only dynamical and information processing
constraints discussed in appendix 2).
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Appendix 1: Quantum-like models in biology
This paper is not about quantum bio-physics, cf. [53], [54]-[56]. It is closer to works
on so called quantum-like models exploring the apparatus of quantum probability
and information theories to model biological phenomena [57]–[76], [55], [56]. In
quantum-like modeling one does not try to study genuine quantum physical pro-
cesses in a bio-system. The latter is considered as a black box processing informa-
tion in accordance with the laws of quantum probability and information. More-
over, quantum probabilistic-informational behavior need not be explicitly coupled
to quantum physical processes. Quantum-like behavior can be exhibited by macro-
scopic bio-systems operating at time, space, and temperature scales which do not
match the corresponding scales of the quantum physics.
The most successful applications of the quantum-like approach are in modeling
brain’s functioning, cognition, decision making, psychology, see, e.g., the mono-
graphs [62], [63], [71]. Here the brain is treated as a black box with inputs from
environment (both physical and mental) and outputs in the form of perceptions,
decisions and judgments. The probabilistic-information structure of interrelation
between inputs and outputs cannot be described mathematically by the laws of
classical probability and information. Therefore alternative (“nonclassical”) the-
ories have to be proposed. The quantum formalism is the most well developed,
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advanced and approved in numerous applications. Therefore it is reasonable to
apply this formalism as an alternative to the classical probability and information
formalisms. This was done in the aforementioned applications outside of physics.
Of course, one cannot guarantee that in biological applications nonclassicality coin-
cides with quantumness. It can happen that from the probabilistic and information
viewpoints behavior of biological systems is even more complicated than behavior
of quantum systems; may be the brain can exhibit informational patterns which
structure is more complex than the structure of genuine quantum patterns. May
be novel mathematical formalisms have to be designed for biological purposes.
Once again we remind that the quantum-like model of brain’s functioning
differs from the “quantum physical brain model” in the spitit of R. Penrose [77]
and S. Hameroof [78]. The latter tries to connect cognitive actions of the brain at
the level of consciousness with physical processes in the brain at the quantum level.
The main bio-physical structure involved to this process are micro-tubular. It is
claimed that they can be used by the brain for quantum information processing.
In particular, they can exhibit such a basic feature of quantum physical systems
as entanglement. Justification of this conjecture is the big challenge. For the
moment, we cannot reject completely the possibility that the brain really works
in this way by exploring quantum physical processes, e.g., at the level of micro-
tubular. However, to justify this theory of brain’s functioning one has to solve
many problems and some authors presented very heavy arguments that the hot
amd macroscopic brain cannot “enjoy” exciting features of the quantum world, see,
e.g., Tengmark [79]. However, the creators of the quantum physical brain model
argue that quantum features still can be preserved in the brain, at least for time-
intervals sufficient to perform a kind of quantum computation leading to cognitive
processing of information. The lovely debate have been continued already 30 years.
It may take many years to clarify the situation (if such clarification is possible at
all in the framework of existing physical theory).
One of the main problems in justification of the quantum-like approach to mod-
eling of cognitive behavior of bio-systems is the resolution of the famous problem
of hidden variables. For biologists, we say a few words about this problem.
The state ψ of a classical physical system determines the outcomes of all ob-
servables which can be measured for this state. Observables are represented as
functions on the state space, ψ → f(ψ). For example, in classical mechanics the
state ψ is given by the pair ψ = (x, p), position and momentum (the coordinates
in phase space). Here observables can be treated as functions on the phase space,
f = f(x, p). In classical statistical mechanics the state ρ is represented by the
probability distribution on the phase space; observables are also defined as func-
tions on the phase space. This kind of states, statistical states, do not determine
the measurement outcomes, but only the probabilities of these outcomes. Thus the
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average of the observable represented by the function f in the state given by the
probability distribution ρ is calculated by the rule of classical probability theory:
〈f〉ρ =
∫
f(x, p)dρ(x, p). (8)
If the probability has the density ρ(x, p), then the average is given by the integral:
〈f〉ρ =
∫
f(x, p)ρ(x, p)dxdp.
The state of a quantum system is represented by a (normalized) vector ψ of
complex Hilbert space H, i.e., 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1, where 〈φ1|φ2〉 denotes the scalar product
of vectors φ1, φ2 ∈ H. Quantum observables are represented by Hermitian oper-
ators. Similarly to the state used in classical statistical mechanics, it determines
only the probabilities of outcomes. However, in contrast to classical statistical
mechanics, the quantum average is represented as
〈A〉ψ = 〈Aψ|ψ〉. (9)
From the very beginning of quantum mechanics, the following question dis-
turbed its fathers: Is it possible to introduce a quantum analog of the classical
phase space? More generally this is the question about the possibility of func-
tional representation of quantum observables and measure-theoretic representation
of quantum states. In particular, one wonders whether it is possible to represent
quantum average (9) in the classical integral form (8).
Since for the moment physical parameters determining the outputs of mea-
surements are unknown 4, they got the name hidden variables. Two orthogonal
positions were presented by Einstein and Bohr, respectively. Einstein was sure that
such variables determining the values of quantum observables exist and this is just
a matter of time, soon or latter the formalism with hidden variables reproducing
quantum measurement theory will be designed. Bohr was sure that this will never
happen, hidden variables do not exist. Bohr’s position was merely philosophical.
Later it was transformed into mathematical statements known as “no-go” theo-
rems. The first of them was proven by J. von Neumann. However, it was criticized
as unphysical. The most famous no-go theorem was formulated by J. Bell. It is
based on the inequality for correlations known as Bell’s inequality. A theory with
hidden variables should produce correlations which satisfy this inequality. But the
quantum formalism implies correlations violating this inequality. The experiment
seems to be in favor of the quantum prediction. We emphasize that Bell’s no-go
4In contrast to classical mechanics, the pair position-momentum, ψ = (x, p), cannot
serve as such parameters, because the position and momentum cannot be measurement
jointly. By the orthodox version of the Copenhagen interpretation they even “do not
exist”.
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theorem differs crucially from von Neumann’s theorem. Bell lifted up the issue of
nonlocality which first mentioned by Einstein. This issue was not present in von
Neumann’s theorem. The main point in our discussion is that a nonlocal hidden
variable model can match the predictions of quantum mechanics. Correlations
based on signaling between subsystems can violate Bell’s inequality. In physics
such signaling is impossible, because subsystems, e.g., two entangled photons, are
separated for a long distance such that signaling should have the speed extending
the speed of light. Therefore quantum nonlocality appears as a mystical physical
phenomenon, the spooky action at a distance.
Now we turn again to biology. In contrast to quantum physics, here “hidden
variables do exist”. Moreover, they are not hidden at all. These are states of
neurons in brain science, states of proteins, genes, cells in molecular biology and
so on. It seems that those who apply the quantum-like approach are in trouble.
Quantum theory says that there are no (local) hidden variables, but biology says
that they exist (and not even hidden). The key word here is (non)local. In biology
we need not be afraid of nonlocal models, because they are nonlocal only formally.
In reality nonlocal contributions to observations can be generated by signaling
between subsystems, e.g., between cells. This signaling is not mystical, since its
speed does not exceeds the speed of light. The crucial point is that biological
systems are negligibly small in size (comparing with light’s velocity), cf. [66].
Thus we can apply the quantum formalism to biological phenomena without to
collide with no-go theorems!
As was pointed out, quantum-like modeling was very successful i modeling of
cognition and decision making. However, recently quantum operational methods
were extended to model behavior of micro-biological systems, e.g., cells, genomes,
epigenomes, and proteins [80], [81]. Thus we can speak about quantum information
biology as unifying information processing at all scales, from molecular biology to
cognition and social science, see [82], [83] for details.
Appendix 2: P -adic mapping representation of
epistemic automata
In this section following V. Anashin [2] we shall consider representation of ap-
parata by mappings of the ring of p-adic numbers Zp. We start with present-
ing theory of automata in more detail. We remind that the initial automaton
A(s0) = 〈I, S, V, f, g, s0〉 is an automaton, where one state s0 ∈ S is fixed; s0 is
called the initial state. In particular, the Mealy machines [46] (and hence the
Moore machines [47]) are initial automata with finite state spaces.
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Figure 1: Functioning of initial automation
In theory of automata it is often assumed that there exists a state s0 ∈ S such
that all the states of the automaton A are reachable from s0; that is, given state
s ∈ S, there exists input word w over alphabet I such that after the word w has
been fed to the automaton A(s0), the automaton reaches the state s.
To the automaton A we put into a correspondence the family of all initial
automata A(s) = 〈I, S, V, f, g, s〉, s ∈ S.
Now we assume that both alphabets I and O are p-element alphabets: I =
O = {0, 1, ..., p − 1} = Fp; so further the word automaton stands for initial
automaton with input/output alphabets Fp. A typical example of an automa-
ton of that sort is the 2-adic adding machine, A(1) = 〈F2, F2, F2, f, g, 1〉, where
f(i, s) = is(mod 2), g(i, s) = i + s(mod 2) for s ∈ S = F2, i ∈ I = F2.
Given an automaton A(s) = 〈I, S, V, f, g, s〉, the automaton transforms input
words (with respect to the alphabet Fp) of length n into output words of length
n; that is, A(s) maps the set Wn of all words of length n into Wn; we denote
corresponding mapping via FA;n(s). It is clear now that behaviour of the automaton
can be described in terms of the mappings FA;n(s) for all s ∈ S and all n ∈ N =
{1, 2, 3, ...}. If all states of the automaton are reachable from the state s0, it suffices
to study only the mappings FA;n(s0) for all n ∈ N.
Of course, here “suffices” has the epistemic meaning, i.e., by considering the
mappings FA;n(s0), instead of the original automaton, we neglect by the dynamics
of the ontic states; in our case the dynamics of conformational states. We also
make the following methodological comment. The ideology of representation of an
automaton by mappings FA;n(s0) is different from the ideology presented in this
paper: transition from the ontic automaton to the epistemic one through factoriza-
tion of the ontic state space. By moving to the FA;n(s0)-functional representation
we neglect the state dynamics.
The system of functions FA;n(s0) can be considered as the mapping in the space
of infinite words in the alphabet Fp. The latter can be identified with the ring of
p-adic integers Zp. Thus each automaton can be represented by a mapping u =
FA : Zp → Zp, u(x) =
∑n
k=0 δk(x)p
k, where x =
∑n
k=0 xkp
k and δk, k = 0, 1, 2...,
are “coordinate functions” valued in Fp.
Mappings generated by automata have very special structure. This structure
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is encoded in the coordinate functions. Here δk depends only on the coordinates
x0, ..., xk of the variable x : δk = δk(x0, ..., xk). In the protein model this means
that protein cannot feel future states of the environment; its state at the instance
of time tk = k depends only on environment’s states at the previous instances of
time t = 0, 1, ..., k. It can be easily shown that such function u = FA : Zp → Zp
satisfies 1-Lipschitz condition:
ρp(u(x), u(y)) ≤ ρp(x, y), x, y ∈ Zp, (10)
where ρp is the p-adic distance. This class of functions in relation to theory of
automata was introduced by V. Anashin [13], [16], [18], [2], [3] and it plays the
important role in theory of p-adic dynamical systems, e.g., [84, 85]. We call the
space of 1-Lipschitz functions the Anashin functional space. Thus in the episte-
mological model one can in principle consider just a mapping FA belonging to the
Anashin space (if we are not interested in the dynamics of epistemic states). The
following natural question arises:
Can any mapping belonging to Anashin’s space be generated by some automa-
ton?
The answer is ‘yes’, but in general the state space of the automaton can be
infinite [2]. As we have already discussed, by treating protein-automata as com-
putational machines we have to restrict modeling to finite state spaces. At the
same time physics gives us arguments in favor of infinite and even continuous
state spaces.
The problem of description of functions representing finite automata in terms of
generated p-adic mappings were solved by Vuillemin [20] (for p = 2), Smyshlyaeva
[21] and Anashin [3] (for an arbitrary p). Their solutions, although beautiful
mathematically (and based on the use of coordinate functions and van der Put
series, respectively), are too technical and too abstractly formulate to be applicable
to our biological modeling.
Now we discuss other special features of automata modeling of proteins’ behav-
ior (in Anashin-like manner, i.e., by using the representation by p-adic functions).
We have already pointed out that the Moore machines seems to be more natural
for such modeling than the general Mealy machines. However, in the p-adic func-
tional approach the difference between these two types of finite states machines
disappears: the classes of functions representing these machines coincide. For any
function representing a Mealy machine, it is possible to construct a Moore machine
representable by this function (of course, the inverse statement is also true). This
feature of Anashin’s representation is not so natural for our approach to proteins’
modeling. However, the real situation is more complicated, since we are not sure
that the space of protein’s conformational states can be represented adequately as
a finite state space. Thus it may be that we have to proceed with “generalized
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Moore machines” having infinite state spaces. We do not know whether functional
classes representing such machines and general automata coincide or not.
The aforementioned result about the coincidence of p-adic functional classes
for the Moore and Mealy machines shows that the functional approach, although
very powerful from the mathematical viewpoint, shadows the internal structure of
an automaton. We would like to mention another problem which is especially im-
portant for non-finite machines. The state space of a biological or physical system
is not only a set of point; typically it is endowed with some topological structure
which plays the important role in understanding of functioning of this system. The
simplest examples are state spaces S = {s1, ..., sn, ...} with the discrete topology
and S = R with its continuous topology. It seems that this difference in topologi-
cal structures of state spaces disappear in the functional representation. However,
may be a deeper analysis can clarify this connection between topology on S and
the special features of the corresponding p-adic mapping FA. For example, suppose
that S = Zp and that f : Zp × Zp → Zp and g : Zp × Zp → Zp are continuous
functions. May be the corresponding mapping FA : Zp → Zp has some special
features? May be the difference can be monitored not at the level of a topolog-
ical structure, but a differential structure on S? For example, FA : Zp → Zp is
differentiable if both f and g are differentiable.
We continue the discussion on determination of the subspace of the Anashin
functional space corresponding to “protein automata.” In general theory of au-
tomata one of the commonly used classes is the class of transitive automata. We
recall that a family U of mappings of a finite non-empty set M into M is called
transitive whenever given a pair (a, b) ∈ M ×M, there exists u ∈ F such that
u(a) = b. An automaton is transitive if it can generate an arbitrary output from
an arbitrary input. Anashin [2] characterized transitive automata in terms of er-
godicity of corresponding mappings from Zp to Zp. Since for our protein-modeling
we are interested in finite-automata, we make two remarks on interrelation of
ergodicity and the possibility of the finite-automata realization [2], [3]:
• There exist ergodic mappings belonging to the Anashin class which are not
representable by finite automata. For example, ergodic polynomials of de-
grees > 1 cannot be represented by finite automata.
• An ergodic polynomial of the degree one, i.e., an affine mapping of the
form f(x) = ax + b can be represented by a finite automaton if and only
if its coefficients a, b are rational p-adic numbers, i.e., they belong to the
intersection of Zp and Q, where Q is the field of rational numbers.
5
5 The number x belonging to Zp is rational if and only if its representation by the
sequence of digits, see (5), is periodic, i.e., some block of digits is repeated periodically.
28
We remark that consideration of mappings determined by rational parameters
matches with the ideology of p-adic theoretical physics, see, for example, [86]–
[89], [15]. Here only rational numbers are treated as “physical numbers”, numbers
which can get experimental verification.
However, this very useful class of automata, transitive-automata, does not
match with our protein model. As was discussed at the very end of section 8, a
protein is very specialized machine and its reacts very concretely to any input pat-
tern of the environment producing very special functional output. Thus proteins
have to be modeled by non-transitive automata.
The simplest non-transitive automata are given by locally constant mappings,
i.e., continuous mappings taking only finitely many values. We remark that in the
p-adic and more generally ultrametric case the characteristic function of a ball is
continuous! A locally constant mapping can be represented as a linear combination
of such characteristic functions, i.e., Zp can be represented as the disjoint union
of (finitely many) balls such that this mapping takes the constant value at each
ball. Locally constant functions play the important role in the p-adic (ultrametric)
analysis. They form the dense subspace in the space of all continuous functions.
In section 9.2 starting with the ultrametric structure of the ontic state space
we proposed representation of the epistemic state space as the space of balls.
Therefore it is natural to assume that the output function (observational function)
g is locally constant on the ontic state space S. Therefore it is natural as well to
suppose that the realization of the protein-automaton by a mapping FA : Zp → Zp
is also a locally constant function. Now the following question arises: Which locally
constant functions can be realized by finite automata? The answer is known [2]:
only functions taking the p-adic rational values. This again matches with the
ideology of the p-adic theoretical physics.
Under the assumption that behavior of proteins can be mathematically mod-
eled with the aid of the Mealy machines (finite state automata), we can guess
that the class of protein-automata is a subclass of the class of automata for which
FA is a locally constant p-adic rational-valued function. However, to describe this
subclass precisely we have to analyze this problem taking into account more del-
icate biological and molecular features of representation of proteins by automata.
In general characterization of the class of automata matching proteins’ behavior
is the interesting mathematical problem. And we hope that publication of this
concept-paper would attract interest of mathematicians and molecular biologists
to study of this problem.
This characterization is similar to characterization of rational numbers in the field of real
numbers R : these are numbers having periodic decimal representations.
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